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Present levels of income inequality in Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, 
and Slovenia remain considerably higher than their pre-
transition levels, although the relative pace of change over 
time has varied quite a bit across countries. Using data 
from the 2006 European Union Survey of Income and 
Living Conditions, this paper finds that prevailing levels 
of income inequality in these countries continue to be 
low by international standards, and that this is in large 
part due to the very high redistributive impact of direct 
taxes and public transfers. In addition to the instrumental 
role of tax and transfer policies in redistributing 
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income, the paper highlights the important role played 
by differences in education levels and labor market 
participation rates in explaining observed inequalities 
across people and across different regions (although not 
in explaining observed differences across countries). The 
paper includes an analysis of key factors that help explain 
observed variation across countries in the level of public 
support for redistribution, including peoples’ economic 
background and relative success in life, whether they 
perceive poverty to be associated with factors within 
or outside the control of those it afflicts (for example, 
laziness/lack of willpower vs. injustice in society).  
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1.  One of the earliest studies to systematically document changes in distributional outcomes in 
countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia during their transition from planned to market 
economies was carried out by the World Bank in 2000.1 This study found that although income 
disparities between the rich and the poor increased in virtually all transition economies during the 
1990s, the extent of increase varied considerably across countries: for example, among Central 
European transition countries, the increase in inequality was considerably lower than that observed in 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In explaining the main causes for the observed 
increase in income inequality, the study highlighted the role of increased inequality of labor earnings, 
which in turn could be traced to a rapid rise in returns to education. Government tax and transfer 
policies were found to have a powerful impact on the distribution of disposable incomes: for 
example taxes and transfers dampened the rises in income inequality due to increased dispersion of 
earnings in Central European countries to a considerably greater extent than in the CIS. 
2.  This paper focuses on selected Central European and Baltic countries—in particular, Poland, 
Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia (henceforth referred 
to as the EU8). Citizens of EU8 countries, it appears, have a high aversion to income inequality. 
Most respondents interviewed in these countries in the EBRD-World Bank Life in Transition Survey 
either “strongly agreed” (36 percent) or “agreed” (38 percent) with the statement “the gap between 
the rich and the poor in this country should be reduced”.2 Likewise, there seems to be very strong 
public support for direct state involvement in tackling inequality: an overwhelming majority of 
respondents thought the government should either be “strongly involved” (51 percent) or 
“moderately involved” (40 percent) in reducing the gap between the rich and the poor (Chart 1).  














Responses to the statement “The gap between the rich 
and the poor in this country should be reduced” 
Desired extent of state involvement in reducing 
income gap between rich and poor 
 Source: 2006 EBRD-World Bank Life in Transition Survey data for EU EU8 countries. 
3.  Given these strong political preferences, one would expect public policy in these countries to 
play an important role in reducing income inequalities, both through the national taxation as well as 
                                                 
1 Making Transition Work for Everyone: Poverty and Inequality in Europe and Central Asia , World Bank, Washington DC (2000). 
2 For more details about this survey, see Annex 1. benefits systems. Analyzing variations across countries in peoples’ preferences for redistributive state 
spending, many studies have found that respondents in post-socialist countries profess greater 
support for such spending than their U.S. or Western counterparts; however, these preferences are 
not necessarily confined to post-socialist countries alone, as many OECD countries (e.g. Norway, 
Italy) also exhibit similar such public preferences for high redistributive state spending.3  
4.  Using data from household surveys conducted in EU8 and other countries in the region that 
have recently become available—the European Union Surveys of Income and Living Conditions 
(EU-SILC) as well as the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS)4—this paper focuses on examining three 
main questions:5  
¾  How high are income inequalities in EU8 countries, and how do they compare to prevailing 
levels in EU15 countries as well as other countries in the rest of the world?  
¾  What role do income taxes and other such direct taxes as well as public transfers through the 
benefit systems play in redistributing incomes within these countries?  
¾  To what extent can the income inequalities we observe across households and regions be 
explained by differences in factors like education levels and labor force participation rates? 
5.  Cross-country comparisons of income inequality are in general fraught with numerous 
comparability issues arising from the lack of a uniform basis to define key variables as well as 
differing methods of data collection. However, the EU-SILC data set provides an unprecedented 
opportunity for comparison of income inequality across a large set of countries, as it contains 
information on incomes, taxes paid, benefits and transfers received etc., based upon a common 
definition across all covered countries (see Box 1 for definitions of key variables used in the analysis). 
6.  Section 2 presents a snapshot of long-term trends in income inequality; in particular, it shows 
that there was considerable diversity across EU8 countries in pattern of change in income inequality: 
the Gini coefficient of income inequality fell in Estonia, remained unchanged in Poland, rose slightly 
in Slovenia and Lithuania, but rose sharply in Latvia and Hungary.  
7.  Section 3 compares prevailing levels of income inequality in EU8 countries with other countries, 
and shows that even though most EU8 countries have average incomes considerably lower than in 
EU15 countries, they have similar levels of inequality. While income inequality in EU countries is 
quite low compared to other countries in the rest of the world, this is in large part due to the very 
strong redistributive role of government tax and transfer policies. 
8.  Section 4 shows that even though the relative sizes of the respective national direct taxes and 
transfers systems may vary across member states, they all play an extremely important role in 
redistributing income from the relatively better-off to the poor. 
                                                 
3 For an excellent review of this literature, see Murthi, M & E. Tiongson “Attitudes to Equality: The “Socialist Legacy” 
Revisited”, Policy Research Working Paper 4529, World Bank, Washington DC 
4 The two main household survey data sets used in this paper as well as the main variables used in the analysis are described 
in the Appendix. 
5 More details on these two household surveys are presented in Annex 1. 
  5Box 1: Definitions of Key EU-SILC Variables Used in the Analysis 
Total disposable household income is the sum for all household members of gross personal income components 
(including gross employee cash or near cash income, gross non-cash employee income, gross cash benefits or losses 
from self-employment, value of goods produced for own consumption, unemployment benefits, old-age benefits, 
survivor benefits, sickness benefits, disability benefits, and education-related allowances) plus gross income 
components at the household level (including imputed rent, income from rental of a property or land, family/children 
related allowances, social exclusion not elsewhere classified, housing allowances, regular inter-household cash transfers 
received, interest dividends, profit from capital investments in unincorporated business, income received by people 
aged under 16) minus interest paid on mortgage, regular taxes on wealth, regular inter-household cash transfers paid, 
tax on income and social insurance contributions (including tax adjustments-repayment/receipt on income, income tax 
at source, and social insurance contributions).  
Equivalent household size is computed assigning a weight of 1 to the first household member aged 14 years and 
older, 0.5 to each additional household member aged 14 years and older, and 0.3 to each household member aged 13 
years or less. 
Equivalized disposable income is computes as total disposable household income / equivalent household size. 
Benefits include unemployment, old-age, survivors, sickness, disability, education, family benefits, other social 
exclusion, and housing allowances.  
Taxes include regular taxes on wealth, taxes on income and social insurance contributions, as well as employer’s social 
contributions. 
Post tax-benefit incomes (Table 4) are the same as equivalized disposable incomes 
Post tax incomes (Table 4) = Equivalized disposable incomes – equivalized benefits 
Pre-tax benefit incomes (Table 4) = Equivalized disposable incomes – equivalized benefits + equivalized taxes 
Pre-transfer incomes (Chart 7) = Pre-tax benefit incomes  
Post-transfer incomes (Chart 7) = Equivalized disposable incomes 
9.  Section 5 analyzes key factors that help explain the observed variation across EU8 countries in 
level of public support for redistribution, highlighting the important role of factors like peoples’ 
economic background and relative success, whether they associate poverty with factors within / 
outside the control of those afflicted (e.g. laziness/lack of willpower vs. injustice in society).  
10.  Section 6 examines the role played by differences in education levels and labor force 
participation rates in explaining income inequality: in particular the analysis shows that while these 
factors play an important role in explaining observed regional disparities within countries, they fail to 
explain the large differences in living standards observed between EU countries.  
11.  Finally, Section 7 concludes with a discussion of some of the main policy implications of the 
findings presented in the paper.       
 
  62.  HAS INCOME INEQUALITY CONTINUED TO RISE IN EU8 COUNTRIES? 
12.  During the early years of transition, income inequality rose sharply in virtually all transition 
countries (including in EU8 countries, albeit to a lesser extent), and has been attributed in varying 
degrees on a diverse set of contributory factors, such as greater wage decompression, higher 
unemployment rates, building-up of wage arrears, reduced public spending on transfers, rapid 
inflation, etc.6 Following the severe contraction in output and employment in the early years of 
transition, has the steady improvement in economic performance since the mid-1990s been 
accompanied by continued increases in income inequality in EU8 countries?  
13.  Table 1 compares income inequality estimates for EU8 countries derived from the 2006 EU-
SILC data with those reported in World Bank (2000).7 While all Gini coefficients reported here are 
based on the distribution of equivalized disposable incomes which were standardized to the extent 
possible to aid comparability,8 differences nonetheless remain as it is impossible to completely 
eliminate these. These estimates should therefore be seen as broadly indicative (i.e. rather than 
definitive evidence per se) of long-term trends in inequality.9  
Table 1: Long-term Trends in Income Inequality 
  Gini coefficient for income per capita 
Country 1987-90  1993-94  1996-99  2006 
Slovakia -  -  -  0.30 
Slovenia  0.22 0.29 0.25 0.26 
Poland  0.28 0.28 0.33 0.33 
Czech  Republic  0.19 0.23 0.25 0.27 
Estonia  0.24 0.35 0.37 0.35 
Lithuania  0.23 0.33 0.34 0.37 
Hungary  0.21 0.23 0.25 0.34 
Latvia  0.24 0.31 0.32 0.40 
Source: 2006: World Bank staff calculations based on data from the 2006 EU-SILC (based on per capita income, hence 
slightly different from Table 2). Earlier years: Making Transition Work for Everyone, World Bank, Washington DC, 2000. 
14.  These estimates show that between 1996-99 and 2006, there was considerable diversity across 
EU8 countries in pattern of change in income inequality. In particular, the Gini coefficient of income 
inequality fell in Estonia, remained unchanged in Poland, rose slightly in Slovenia and Lithuania, but 
rose sharply in Latvia and Hungary.10 At the same time, the table confirms that present levels of 
income inequality in all EU8 countries continue to be considerably higher than prevailing levels in 
the mid-1980s before the onset of transition. The overall rise in income inequality has been lowest in 
Slovenia and the Czech Republic, and highest in the Baltic countries.  
                                                 
6 See for e.g., Milanovic (1999) Flemming & Micklewright (1999) Aghion & Commander (1999) Mitra & Yemtsov (2006). 
7 Making Transition Work for Everyone: Poverty and Inequality in Europe and Central Asia , Washington D.C. 
8 See World Bank (2000), appendix B for a more detailed description of the data sources used in the study. 
9 Disposable income in the EU-SILC does not, in general, include in-kind incomes. Hence, to the extent that in-kind 
income constitutes a larger share of incomes of the poor, income inequality measures based on disposable incomes will tend 
to overstate inequality compared to those based on wider income measures (i.e. including in-kind incomes). 
10 According to analysis published by the Ministry of Finance, the Gini coefficient for Slovakia in 1988 was 0.19 
(http://www.finance.gov.sk/Documents/Ifp/Publikacie/Makro/EA11_ZIVOTNA_UROVEN.pdf, considerably lower 
than the 2006 Gini in the above table, indicating that income inequality in Slovakia also rose over this period. 
 3.  THE EU8 AND EU15 COUNTRIES HAVE SIMILAR LEVELS OF INCOME INEQUALITY 
15.  Using 2006 EU-SILC data, Table 2 presents average equivalized disposable incomes and four 
commonly-used summary inequality measures for the various countries. Several interesting points 
regarding the distribution of incomes in EU countries are evident from these summary statistics. 
First, country rankings based on prevailing level of income inequality within the broad set of 
countries surveyed are fairly robust to the choice of income inequality indicator—based on nearly all 
inequality measures presented in the above table, Slovenia, Sweden, and Denmark have the lowest 
income inequality among EU countries, while, conversely, Latvia, Portugal, and Lithuania have the 
highest level of income inequality.  
Table 2: Various Summary Measures of Income Inequality 










deviation  Theil index 
Slovenia  10,176  0.239 0.466 0.167 0.097 
Sweden  19,088  0.240 0.519 0.166 0.109 
Denmark  24,272  0.241 0.541 0.167 0.112 
Czech Republic    5,497  0.249  0.595  0.175  0.119 
Austria  20,163  0.254 0.513 0.177 0.113 
Netherlands  19,943  0.258 0.613 0.180 0.128 
Finland  20,370  0.264 0.741 0.183 0.143 
France  18,609  0.275 0.625 0.192 0.140 
Luxembourg  33,485  0.276 0.581 0.194 0.133 
Belgium  19,159  0.279 1.518 0.194 0.187 
Slovakia    3,859  0.279  1.189  0.191  0.202 
Spain  13,010  0.310 0.633 0.219 0.166 
Italy  16,949  0.319 0.694 0.223 0.182 
Ireland  23,943  0.322 0.989 0.227 0.215 
Hungary    4,700  0.324  0.887  0.223  0.223 
United  Kingdom  23,066  0.324 0.741 0.228 0.192 
Estonia    4,359  0.329  0.685  0.234  0.187 
Poland    3,768  0.329  0.690  0.232  0.188 
Greece  11,634  0.336 0.720 0.237 0.199 
Lithuania    3,049  0.349  0.717  0.249  0.210 
Portugal    9,602  0.375  0.902  0.268  0.262 
Latvia    3,234  0.387  0.920  0.276  0.277 
Ratio - min. to max:     11.0  1.62  3.26  1.66  2.86 
Source: World Bank staff calculations based on data from the 2006 EU-SILC. Gini coefficient is a measure of statistical 
dispersion used as a measure of inequality of income distribution, with values between 0 and 1 (0 corresponds to perfect 
equality whereby everyone has exactly the same income, and 1 corresponds to perfect inequality where one person has all 
the income, while everyone else has zero income). Coefficient of variation is a measure of statistical dispersion obtained by 
dividing the standard deviation by the mean. Relative mean deviation is a measure of statistical dispersion defined such that 
IR = ∑ ׀ µ - xi ׀  / Nµ. Theil index is a measure of statistical dispersion defined such that IT = 1 / N ∑ xi / µ ln (xi / µ). IT 
lies between 0 (everyone’s incomes are equal) and ln N (one person has all the income). 
16.  Second, while most EU8 countries (except Slovenia) have average incomes considerably lower 
than those in EU15 countries, the extent of income inequality is in fact quite similar to that in EU15 
countries (Chart 2). Finally, while we do observe some variation in the levels of inequality across 
countries (the Gini coefficient varies from a low of 0.24 in Slovenia to 0.39 in Latvia), most of the 
income inequality in the European Union is in fact between rather than within countries (average 
incomes vary by a factor of eleven across countries, from ~3,000 euros in Lithuania to 34,000 
euros/equivalent adult/year in Luxembourg). Among EU8 countries, at the top end of the rankings 
are Slovenia and the Czech Republic (i.e. countries with greatest equality of incomes), which are quite 
similar to low-inequality Nordic countries like Sweden and Denmark (Gini coefficient ~ 0.24). 
Slovakia has slightly higher income inequality (Gini coefficient 0.28) similar in level to that in many 
  8other central European countries. At the bottom end, Hungary, Poland and the Baltic countries 
(Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) have fairly high income inequality (Gini coefficient ~ 0.33–0.38), at 
least when compared to other EU countries. However, income inequality in these countries is still 
much lower than in most other countries in the world. The 2006 Gini coefficient of income 
inequality in Latvia (0.38) was the same as that in the United States (Gini coefficient of 0.38 in 2000), 
but lower than that in Thailand (Gini coefficient 0.40 in 2002), Chile (Gini coefficient 0.51 in 2000), 
and Brazil (Gini coefficient 0.59 in 2001).11 
Chart 2. Most EU8 countries have average incomes much lower than in the EU15 countries    
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 Source: World Bank staff calculations based on data from the 2006 EU-SILC 
                                                 
11 See World Development Report (2006) for details. 
  94.  TAX AND TRANSFER POLICIES PLAY A VERY IMPORTANT REDISTRIBUTIVE ROLE 
17.   While income inequality in EU countries is in general quite low compared to other countries in 
the world, this is in large part due to the strong redistributive roles of their national tax and benefit 
systems. General government spending in EU countries averages close to half their total GDP, a 
considerably higher share than in the United States and other OECD countries. In addition to 
differences in levels of total government spending, EU countries devote a considerably larger share 
of public expenditures to direct transfers to households and subsidies—for instance spending on 
social programs like old-age disability and survivors’ benefits, unemployment and other labor market 
programs as a share of GDP is considerably higher than in the United States. The importance of 
social programs in redistributing incomes in Europe is well-known, and has been the subject of 
considerable scholarly attention. While less is known about the structure of personal taxes in these 
countries, broad comparisons undertaken earlier suggest that the income tax system in European 
countries is also considerably more progressive than in the United States.12  
18.  Using data from the EU-SILC, this section analyzes the progressivity of the tax and benefit 
systems in different EU countries, with a particular emphasis on EU8 countries. A key advantage of 
using unit-record survey data to examine the incidence of the respective tax and benefits systems 
across different countries is that the analysis can move beyond comparing simple averages to 
analyzing variations in tax incidence across different income groups. We start first by presenting 
some summary statistics on the relative size of the tax and benefit system in the various EU member 
countries. Average total taxes and benefits in EU countries, expressed as shares of total equivalized 
disposable incomes, are presented in Table 3.  


















Denmark 26,801  14,538  4,491  52  21 
Netherlands 21,327  10,892  3,091  46  17 
Sweden  20,407    9,383  4,288  42  25 
Poland    4,019    1,405    886  33  27 
Belgium  20,136    7,510  4,404  32  30 
Finland  22,072    7,827  4,479  32  26 
Austria  20,933    6,955  4,365  31  24 
United Kingdom  25,144    8,948  3,718  31  21 
Slovenia  10,493    3,390  2,797  27  31 
Luxembourg  36,094    9,715  6,429  24  20 
Czech Republic    5,837    1,393  1,140  21  25 
Hungary    4,960    1,236  1,294  21  33 
Estonia    4,675      969    786  18  24 
Lithuania    3,213      706    640  18  28 
Slovakia    4,085      775    862  17  23 
Ireland  24,404    4,815  5,205  15  32 
Spain  13,192    2,119  2,756  14  28 
Source: World Bank staff calculations based on 2006 EU-SILC data.  Countries are sorted in descending order of 
the average tax share (tax share computed for each household as total taxes paid / total disposable income) 
19.  Among EU members, the tax share varies from a low of 14 percent in Spain to over 50 percent 
in Denmark. Among the EU8 group, tax shares are in general considerably lower than in other EU15 
                                                 
12 For instance, see Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote “Why Doesn’t the United States have a European-style Welfare 
State?”, Bookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 2001, No. 2, pp. 187-254. countries (Poland, however, is a notable exception—see Chart 3). Slovakia, Lithuania and Estonia 
have relatively low tax shares (around 17-18 percent of equivalized disposable incomes).13 Next are 
Hungary and the Czech Republic (21 percent), followed by Slovenia (27 percent). Finally, taxes as a 
share of equivalized disposable incomes are highest in Poland (33 percent), close to twice the average 
shares in Slovakia and the Baltic countries. 












































































































































































 Source: World Bank staff calculations using 2006 EU-SILC data. 
20.  Chart 4  compares the size of benefits across different EU member states, expressed as a share 
of equivalized disposable incomes. Among EU countries, the benefit share varies from a low of 17 
percent in the Netherlands to 33 percent in Hungary. The share of benefits in the EU8 countries 
t en ds, on  a vera ge, to  b e so mewh at  h igh er th an  in  EU15 co un tries—it  is lo west  in  Esto n ia  a n d 
Slovakia (23 percent) followed by the Czech Republic (25 percent), Poland (27 percent), Slovenia (30 
percent) and Hungary (33 percent). 
                                                 













































































































































































 Source: World Bank staff calculations using 2006 EU-SILC data. 
13 Latvia is excluded from these tables, as data on gross incomes are not available in the EU-SILC dataset. 
  1121.  Chart 5 presents the average share of taxes compared to total disposable income by decile groups 
in each country, as ranked by their level of equivalized disposable income—an upward sloping curve 
therefore shows that taxes as a share of disposable income are relatively greater for higher income 
groups. The tax systems in all EU8 countries are quite progressive, as illustrated by the upward-
sloping tax incidence curves for each country. Even in the flat-rate tax countries of Estonia, 
Lithuania, and Slovakia, it seems the exemption threshold for incomes helps introduce a fairly strong 
element of progressivity in the overall system. In general, however, the degree of progressivity varies 
considerably across EU8 countries: for instance, the tax-incidence curve for Slovenia is considerably 
steeper than in other countries. 
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Source: World Bank staff calculations based on data from the 2006 EU Survey of Income and Living Conditions 
22.  In an analogous manner, Chart 6 presents the benefit-incidence curves for EU8 countries—in 
this case, the degree of progressivity of the benefit system is indicated by magnitude of the negative 
slope of the curves for each country. Several interesting points are evident from these graphs. First, 
the benefit-systems in all countries are considerably more progressive than the respective tax systems, 
not too surprising given that income redistribution (rather than revenue generation) is their main 
objective. Second, despite their high-progressivity, even households in the top income decile receive 
a non-negligible share of incomes in the form of benefits, which in turn helps explain why these 
programs enjoy such widespread public support in all countries. Third, the benefit-systems in 
Hungary and Slovenia are considerably more generous than in other EU8 countries for all income 
levels, indicating that the overall tax-benefit systems in these countries are in fact much more similar 
to their EU15 continental counterparts rather than to the Baltic countries or Poland. Finally, Poland 
and Slovakia stand out as the only countries where the share of benefits accruing to the poorest 
income decile constitutes less than 40 percent of their total disposable incomes. 
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Source: World Bank staff calculations based on data from the 2006 EU Survey of Income and Living Conditions 
23.  The redistributive impacts of the tax and benefits systems by country are summarized in Table 4, 
which illustrates the extent of income redistribution attributable to its tax and benefit system.14 
Table 4: Impact of tax and benefit systems on income inequality in EU countries 









Difference in pre 
/ post tax Ginis 
to post-tax / 
benefit Gini 
EU8 countries: 
Slovenia  0.471 0.369 0.239 0.232  1.97 
Czech  Republic  0.485 0.340 0.249 0.236  1.95 
Hungary  0.568 0.429 0.324 0.244  1.75 
Slovakia  0.474 0.339 0.279 0.195  1.70 
Poland  0.558 0.440 0.329 0.229  1.70 
Lithuania  0.540 0.413 0.349 0.191  1.55 
Estonia  0.499 0.391 0.329 0.170  1.52 
EU15 countries:       
Sweden  0.482 0.335 0.240 0.242  2.01 
Denmark  0.481 0.316 0.241 0.240  2.00 
Netherlands  0.503 0.330 0.258 0.245  1.95 
Austria  0.492 0.336 0.254 0.238  1.94 
Finland  0.507 0.372 0.264 0.243  1.92 
Belgium  0.524 0.390 0.279 0.245  1.88 
Luxembourg  0.486 0.362 0.276 0.210  1.76 
United  Kingdom  0.526 0.376 0.324 0.202  1.62 
Ireland  0.520 0.386 0.322 0.198  1.61 
Spain  0.478 0.372 0.310 0.168  1.54 
Source: World Bank staff calculations based on data from the 2006 EU Survey of Income and Living Conditions 
                                                 
14 Two important caveat need to be borne in mind with regard to the analysis presented here. First, this tax and benefit 
incidence analysis does not take into account general equilibrium considerations arising from changes in the marginal tax or 
benefits rates. Second, even though tax and benefit systems play an important redistributive role, it is important to bear in 
mind that they impose efficiency costs too (e.g. through lowering labor force participation rates, greater informality in the 
economy, etc.) 
  1324.  The Gini coefficient of inequality based on pre-tax-benefit incomes is considerably higher than 
final equivalized disposable incomes—roughly 1.5 times in the case of Estonia to almost twice as 
high in Slovenia. Had it not been for the redistributive impact of taxes and public transfers, income 
inequality in EU countries would have been very high. Rather than low inherent (i.e. pre-tax) wage 
inequality per se, it is the tax and benefit systems that help explain the relatively low income inequality 
typically observed in these countries. 
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Source: World Bank staff calculations based on data from the 2006 EU Survey of Income and Living Conditions 
25.  Chart 7 illustrates the important role of public transfers in reducing income inequality. An 
inverse relationship is evident in the scatter plot of inequality of post-transfer disposable incomes vs. 
extent of redistribution taking place through the tax and benefit systems: not surprisingly, countries 
where governments actively redistribute incomes using the tax and benefit systems tend to have 
considerably lower inequality than those that do not. Thus, Slovenia and the Czech Republic have 
relatively low income inequality because of the strong redistributive role of taxes and benefits; by 
contrast, Baltic countries have higher inequality than other EU8 countries because of the smaller role 
of direct taxes and public transfers in redistributing incomes within these countries.  
26.  An interesting three-way classification of the EU8 countries emerges based on the relative roles 
played by their respective tax and benefit systems in reducing income inequality. The first group 
comprises Estonia and Lithuania,15 with the lowest income redistribution among EU8 countries 
(similar in magnitude to the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Spain). The second group includes 
Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary (higher redistribution than in the Baltic countries, but a bit lower than 
in other continental European countries). Finally, the third group comprises the Czech Republic and 
Slovenia, where income redistribution through taxes and benefits is similar in magnitude to Sweden, 
Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands.  
                                                 
15 Latvia likely belongs to the same group also, though as noted earlier comparable tax and benefit data are not available. 
  145.  WHAT EXPLAINS DIFFERING LEVELS OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR REDISTRIBUTION? 
27.  Data from the 2006 LiTS provide some useful insights into public attitudes towards the 
government’s role in tackling income inequality. Responses to the question “Do you think the state 
should be involved in reducing the gap between the rich and the poor?” illustrate the strong public 
support for redistribution: overall, only about 9 percent of respondents in EU8 countries felt the 
state should “not be involved” in reducing the income-gap (Chart 8), while an overwhelming 
majority favored either moderate or strong state involvement in reducing the income-gap between 
the rich and the poor. 
Chart 8: Strong public support for redistribution in EU8 countries 
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 Source: 2006 EBRD-World Bank Life in Transition Survey. 
 
28.  What are the main reasons why the extent of redistribution taking place through the tax and 
benefit systems is so different across countries? Clearly a multitude of factors come into play in this 
regard; however, an important issue is whether the general public associates poverty with factors 
within or outside the control of those afflicted by it. Chart 9 provides some clues why the level of 
public spending on benefits in Hungary and Slovenia is higher than in Slovakia and Estonia. 
Respondents who feel people are in need because of injustice in society are about 1.5 times as likely 
than others to be in favor of “strong state involvement” in reducing the income-gap between the rich 
and the poor (63 vs. 43 percent respectively); conversely, such respondents are only half as likely as 
the rest of the population to favor “no state involvement” in reducing the income-gap between the 
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  Source: 2006 EBRD-World Bank Life in Transition Survey. 
29.  The LiTS data also show that, overall, about 44 percent of people in EU8 countries feel that 
people are in need because of “injustice in society”, with the ratio varying from 28 percent in Estonia 
to 61 percent in Hungary (Table 5). By contrast, 33 percent of respondents in Estonia felt that people 
were needy because they were “lazy / lacked willpower”, almost twice as high as the share of such 
responses in Hungary.  
Table 5: Perceptions regarding why people are in need 
  Main reason why people are in need in your country 









Hungary  61  16    7  17  100 
Poland 48  22  14  16  100 
Slovenia 38  32  11  19  100 
Czech Republic  27  30  18  25  100 
Latvia  48  20    7  25  100 
Slovakia 32  20  17  31  100 
Estonia 28  28  10  33  100 
Lithuania  38  14    5  42  100 
EU8 countries  44  22  13  21  100 
  Source: World Bank staff calculations based on 2006 LiTS 30.  The results of an ordered probit model to analyze public support for redistribution in EU8 
countries (see Annex 2 for details) confirm the following hypotheses: 
•  Support for redistribution is inversely correlated with economic background: other things being 
equal, a person in the poorest income decile is half as likely as someone in the richest income 
decile to respond that the state should not be involved in reducing the income gap between the 
rich and the poor (plus about 20 percent more likely to be in favor of strong involvement); 
•  Other things being equal, people who have done relatively well during transition are less likely to 
be in favor of state involvement in redistribution compared to those that have not. 
•  A person who thinks that people are in need because of “injustice in society” is over 25 percent 
more likely to be in favor of strong involvement of the state in redistribution as compared to 
someone who thinks other factors help explain why people are in need in their country; a similar 
contrast can be seen between those that think the most important factors to succeed in life today 
are criminal / corrupt ties, as opposed to those thinking otherwise. 
•  Support for redistribution is stronger among rural residents compared to those in urban areas. 
Table 6: Simulated Probabilities Derived from Ordered Probit Model 
  Predicted Probability of Response: 
Ideal Type   
Not involved 
(Govt_role = 1) 
Moderately 
involved 
(Govt_role = 2) 
Strongly 
involved 
(Govt_role = 3) 
 








Economic background:  Poorest decile  0.03  0.30  0.67 
   Richest  decile  0.06  0.39  0.55 
     
Moved from 3rd to 7th decile between 1989 and 2006  0.08  0.43  0.49 
Moved from 7th to 3rd decile between 1989 and 2006  0.03  0.29  0.68 
     
Why are people in need?  Injustice in society  0.03  0.28  0.70 
   Other  reasons  0.06  0.39  0.55 
     
Most important factor to  Criminal / corrupt ties  0.03  0.30  0.67 
  succeed in life today:             Other reasons  0.05  0.36  0.58 
     
Lives in urban areas  0.05  0.36  0.59 
Lives in rural areas  0.04  0.32  0.64 
Respondent from poorest decile living in rural areas, thinks 
people are in need because of injustice in society, most 
important factor to succeed in life today is criminal / 
corrupt ties, has moved from 7th to 3rd decile between 










Respondent from richest decile living in urban areas, thinks 
people are in need because “other reasons”, most important 
factor to succeed in life today is “other reasons”, has moved 













  See Annex 2 for more details on the regression results. 
  176.  THE ROLE OF EDUCATION AND LABOR MARKET PARTICIPATION RATES 
31.  So far, our analysis has focused mainly on the role of public policy in redistributing incomes 
across people. In this section, we examine the role of two other key variables, namely differences in 
(i) labor force participation rates and (ii) differences in education levels, in explaining differences in 
inequality across households, regions, and countries. We start first by illustrating in more detail some 
of the main differences in income distributions across EU8 countries (Table 7).  
Table 7: Distribution of equivalized disposable incomes in EU8 countries 
Population  Total disposable income accruing to the group (expressed as a share of the national average) 
Sub-group Slovenia Czech  R. Slovakia Hungary Estonia  Poland Lithuania Latvia EU8  Group 
p05 32%  36%  29%  17%  19%  20%  16%  10%  24% 
p10 48%  50%  46%  39%  37%  35%  32%  29%  40% 
p15 56%  57%  54%  47%  45%  43%  41%  37%  48% 
p20 62%  62%  60%  53%  50%  49%  47%  42%  54% 
p25 68%  67%  65%  59%  54%  55%  53%  47%  59% 
p30 73%  71%  69%  63%  60%  60%  57%  52%  64% 
p35 77%  75%  73%  68%  64%  65%  63%  57%  68% 
p40 82%  78%  77%  72%  69%  70%  68%  62%  73% 
p45 86%  82%  81%  77%  74%  76%  73%  68%  78% 
p50 90%  86%  85%  82%  80%  81%  79%  75%  83% 
p55 94%  91%  89%  86%  87%  87%  85%  81%  88% 
p60 99%  95%  93%  91%  94%  94%  91%  89%  94% 
p65 105%  101%  98%  97%  101%  101%  99%  97%  100% 
p70 111%  107%  103%  103%  109%  108%  107%  107%  107% 
p75 117%  113%  109%  110%  118%  117%  117%  118%  115% 
p80 124%  120%  116%  118%  130%  128%  129%  129%  124% 
p85 133%  131%  126%  129%  143%  142%  144%  145%  136% 
p90 146%  144%  139%  145%  161%  162%  169%  166%  154% 
p95 166%  165%  161%  176%  196%  195%  208%  207%  183% 
p100 232%  269%  327%  366%  310%  312%  323%  382%  310% 
Total 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
                  
Gini index  0.239  0.249  0.279  0.321 0.327  0.328 0.348 0.383     
Source: World Bank staff calculations based on data from the 2006 EU Survey of Income and Living Conditions 
32.  A few words are in order to describe the content of this table. The EU8 countries are presented 
in order, from left to right, based on their prevailing level of income inequality (Gini coefficient)—i.e. 
Slovenia in the first column has the lowest inequality while Latvia in the next-to-last column has the 
highest income inequality. The total population of each country is divided into 20 equal groups 
ordered by level of income—thus the group p05 contains the poorest 5 percent of the population of 
each country, p10 the next 5 percent, and so on. Finally, each cell in the table expresses the average 
income of that particular population sub-group as a percentage of the prevailing national average 
income. Thus the table shows the poorest 5 percent of Slovenia’s population (i.e. the p05 group) to 
have an average income of 32 percent of the national average, while the corresponding share for the 
richest 5 percent (i.e. the p100 group) is 232 percent. By contrast, the spread of these shares in Latvia 
is much higher—10 percent and 382 percent respectively. 
33.  There are several interesting points to note. First, the table clearly illustrates the relatively large 
size of the middle class in each country—defined as people earning between 75 percent and 125 
percent of the national average. For example, among EU8 countries taken as a group (last column), 
roughly 40 percent of the population (from p45 to p80 inclusive) has total disposable incomes falling 
within this range (the respective country shares range from 30 percent in Latvia to 50 percent in 
Slovenia). Second, average incomes of the poorest 5 percent in Hungary, Poland, and the Baltic 
  18countries (Latvia in particular) are very low—typically 20 percent or even lower, when expressed as a 
share of the prevailing national averages. By contrast, the poorest 5 percent in Slovakia, Czech 
Republic, and Slovenia have considerably higher incomes. Third, the richest 5 percent of the 
population in Latvia and Hungary have very high incomes in relation to the prevailing national 
averages (roughly 3.5 to 4 times as high), in sharp contrast to the rich in Slovenia and the Czech 
Republic (roughly 2 to 2.5 times the national average).  
34.  The distribution of the population aged 16 years and older by level of education is presented in 
Table 8. In addition to illustrating differences in educational attainment across countries, the table 
also shows how, within each country, those with higher education tend to be concentrated among 
the top income groups. Educational attainment in most EU8 countries is, in general, quite high. 
However, the Baltic countries stand out in that a higher share of their adult population has 
completed post-secondary or tertiary education than in other countries. This in turn helps explain (at 
least in part) why average incomes of the top deciles are higher than in other countries. 
Table 8: Educational attainment of the population in EU8 countries 
Level of  Percentage of the population aged 16 yrs and older with level of education indicated 
Education  Slovenia Czech  R. Slovakia Hungary Estonia  Poland Lithuania Latvia 
Population with:          
Primary  or  less  21 0  2 10 6 23 11 4 
Lower  secondary  11 17 19 22 18  3  15 22 
Upper  secondary  51 70 64 50 42 55 30 45 
Post-secondary  /  tertiary  16 12 15 19 34 19 41 29 
          
Poorest decile group:          
Primary  or  less  47 0  4 16 9 29 9  4 
Post-secondary / tertiary  4  3  6  5  23  5  21  13 
          
Richest decile group:          
Primary  or  less  4 0 0 1 0 4 1 0 
Post-secondary  /  tertiary  56 38 37 55 63 56 77 58 
Source: World Bank staff calculations based on data from the 2006 EU Survey of Income and Living Conditions 
35.  In Slovenia and Poland, between one-fifth and one-fourth of the adult population has only 
primary or lesser education. However, as shown in the earlier section, the respective national benefits 
systems redistribute a much higher share of incomes to poor households in Slovenia as compared to 
Poland, as a result of which average incomes of even these disadvantaged groups in the former are 
much more equally distributed than in the case of the latter. In other words, a person with primary 
education or less is much better-off in Slovenia compared to a person with similar qualifications in 
Poland, both in absolute as well as relative terms. The Czech Republic and Slovakia stand out in that 
educational attainment in these countries appears to be more egalitarian than in other EU8 countries. 
This in turn is probably why inequality of disposable incomes is quite low in these two countries, 
despite the relatively smaller role that the national benefits systems play in redistributing incomes 
within these countries. To sum, much of the observed inequality of disposable incomes within 
countries can be attributed to differences in human capital of individuals. 
36.  Table 9 presents the distribution of the working age population aged 18 to 64 years by 
employment status. The unemployed tend to be concentrated among the poorest income decile (an 
odds-ratio of roughly 3-5 compared to the overall population). The EU-SILC data set includes a 
work-intensity variable, whereby each household is assigned a work intensity status ranging from 1 to 
4 (1 denotes not working, and 4 denotes working full-time); as Table 9 clearly shows, average work 
intensity scores for the richest deciles are much higher than the poorest decile group. 
  19Table 9: Work status and level of intensity in EU8 countries 
  Percentage of the population aged 16 yrs and older 
  Slovenia Czech  R. Slovakia Hungary Estonia  Poland Lithuania Latvia 
Percent of population unemployed: 
          Overall  population  6 6 5 4 3 7 5 6 
          Poorest  decile  19 25 20 16 13 24 21 28 
          Richest  decile  1 1 1 1 0 2 1 3 
          
Work intensity: 
          Overall  population  3.1 3.1 3.1 2.9 3.3 2.9 3.2 3.2 
     Poorest decile  2.0  2.0 2.3 1.9 1.9 2.2 2.1 2.1 
     Richest decile  3.6  3.8 3.6 3.5 3.8 3.6 3.8 3.8 
Source: World Bank staff calculations based on data from the 2006 EU Survey of Income and Living Conditions 
Explaining Regional Differences Within and Across EU countries 
37.  For some of the larger EU8 countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) regionally 
disaggregated statistics can also be computed using the SILC data set.16 As Table 10 shows, the 
average standard-of-living varies quite a bit across regions: average equivalized disposable incomes in 
the richest regions are about 33–42 percent higher than in the respective poorest regions. 
Table 10: Regional variation in standard-of-living within selected EU member states 
  Average equivalized disposable income by region 
Region Czech  Republic  Hungary  Poland 
1 7,089  5,516  4,310 
2 5,846  4,648  3,959 
3 5,550  4,134  3,227 
4  5,210  3,595 
5  5,241  4,013 
6  5,149  3,504 
7 5,069     
8 4,995     
Ratio of max / min  1.42 1.33 1.34 
Source: World Bank staff calculations based on data from the 2006 EU Survey of Income and Living Conditions 
38.  The observed differences across regions give rise to an important question: are the poor people 
who live in a particular region poor because they have unfavorable endowments of education and 
other such individual-level attributes linked to low income status, or are their low incomes primarily 
due to region-specific attributes of their place of residence—for example, inadequate infrastructure, 
poor access to basic services, etc.? We use multivariate regression analysis applied to the EU-SILC 
data to help answer the above question, plus to examine more systematically the link between 
education, work status and work intensity and observed differences in (log) equivalized incomes 
across households. The explanatory variables used are summarized in the table below. 
  Obs. Mean  Std.  Deviation  Min  Max 
     Share of 0–17 yr olds  59,300 .135  .203  0  1 
     Share of 18-64 yr olds  59,300 .636  .366  0  1 
     Share of 18+ unemployed  59,300 .061  .169  0  1 
     Share of 18+ retired  59,300 .273  .403  0  1 
     Work intensity status  59,300 2.52  1.28  1  4 
     Share with lower-secondary  59,300 .108  .246  0  1 
     …            Upper-secondary   59,300 .550  .407  0  1 
     … Post-secondary / tertiary  59,300 .193  .339  0  1 
                                                 
16 Czech Republic: Eight NUTS-2 regions; Hungary: Three NUTS-1 regions; Poland: Six NUTS-1 regions. 
  2039.  Regressions were run on the pooled data set comprising observations from all EU8 countries 
(with dummy variables for each country), as well as separately for each country (with dummy 
variables for regions in the case of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland). Regression 
coefficients for the variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 11. 
Table 11: Regression Analysis: (log) Equivalized Disposable Income 
  Coefficient 
  EU8  Slovenia Czech Slovakia  Hungary Estonia Poland  Lithuania Latvia 
Demographic composition of household: 
     Share of 0–17 yr olds  -0.635*** -0.295*** -0.486*** -0.531*** -0.610*** -0.518*** -0.690*** -0.730*** -0.627***
     Share of 18-64 yr olds  -0.088*** 0.106***  0.019 0.061*** -0.111*** -0.241*** -0.136*** -0.209*** -0.205***
     Share of 65+ yr olds  omitted variable 
Employment status: 
     Share of 18+ unemployed  -0.785*** -0.588*** -0.508*** -0.805*** -0.641*** -0.875*** -0.842*** -0.981*** -1.005***
     Share of 18+ retired  0.128*** 0.264*** 0.074*** 0.095*** 0.208*** -0.071** 0.187*** 0.067 -0.271***
     Work intensity status  0.166*** 0.196*** 0.184*** 0.146*** 0.199*** 0.272*** 0.135*** 0.277*** 0.216***
Education: share of 16+ with: 
     Primary education or less  omitted variable 
     Lower-secondary  0.007 0.099***  -0.039 0.027 0.065** -0.005 0.017 -0.086** 0.004
     Upper-secondary   0.253*** 0.358***  0.132 0.214*** 0.305*** 0.127*** 0.283*** 0.090** 0.235***
     Post-secondary / tertiary  0.727*** 0.811*** 0.470*** 0.519*** 0.735*** 0.394*** 0.838*** 0.488*** 0.645***
Regression constant  7.9*** 8.1*** 8.0*** 7.5*** 7.6*** 7.5*** 7.7*** 7.0*** 7.2***
  country / regional dummies included in regression specification, but excluded from output reported here 
Number of observations  59,161 7,482 5,603 7,691 4,642 4,266 14,896  9,478 5,103
R-squared  0.42 0.45 0.37 0.37 0.39 0.37 0.35  0.41 0.32
Significance level of reported coefficients:  0.01 - ***; 0.05 - **; 0.1 - * 
40.  In EU8 countries overall (as well as in each country), we find disposable incomes to be 
negatively correlated with share of household members aged 0-17 years.17 Correlation of incomes 
with share of people aged 18-64 years is positive in Slovenia, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic (not 
statistically significant in the case of the latter), but negative in other countries. Employment status is 
a strong predictor of welfare in all EU8 countries, with disposable incomes negatively correlated with 
share of unemployed household members, and positively correlated with work intensity status. The 
size of the association is relatively more pronounced in the Baltic countries, which is consistent with 
our earlier finding regarding the relatively smaller size of redistributive public transfers in these 
countries. Similarly, disposable incomes are positively correlated with level of educational attainment 
of household members in all countries, with the “premiums” associated with tertiary / secondary 
education highest in Slovenia and Poland (countries with the highest share of population with 
primary education or lower).  
Differences in human capital and labor force participation rates across regions explain a 
large part of the observed differences in living conditions within countries 
41.  Controlling for differences in demographic composition, employment, and education status 
across regions, how important are unobservable location-specific factors in explaining regional 
differences in living standards? The regression coefficients of virtually all regional dummies included 
in the country-level regressions are statistically significant, indicating the presence of unexplained 
region-specific factors impacting living standards. However, as shown in Table 12, after one has 
accounted for differences in income levels attributable to differences in work status, demographic 
                                                 
17 This is not quite as obvious a finding as may initially appear, since equivalized incomes in EU countries incorporate very 
high equivalence / economies-of-scale adjustment factors. 
  21and educational endowments across regions, regional differentials between the richest and poorest 
region are considerably lower than at first sight (i.e. before accounting for differences in 
endowments). Differences in endowments account for roughly one-half (Poland) to two-thirds 
(Hungary) of the observed differences in disposable incomes across regions (Table 12). Similarly, 
differences in demographic and educational endowments help explain a good deal of the observed 
differences in disposable incomes across urban and rural areas within all EU8 countries. 
Table 12: Unadjusted vs. adjusted regional variation in standard-of-living 
 Ratio 
Equivalized Disposable Incomes 
Czech 
Republic Hungary  Poland 
Ratio of richest region / poorest region:   
Unadjusted: 1.42 1.33 1.34 
Controlling for demographic, employment, 
and educational differences  1.16 1.11 1.18 
Source: World Bank staff calculations based on data from the 2006 EU-SILC. 
… but do not help much in explaining differences in living standards across countries 
42.  How much of the observed differences in average living standards between EU8 vs. EU15 
countries can be explained by differences in human capital and labor market outcomes? We run a 
pooled regression on data for all EU22 countries to assess the extent to which differences in the 
independent variables [i.e. demographic composition, employment status, and educational 
attainment] help explain observed differences in living standards across these countries. However, in 
contrast to our earlier findings that differences in endowments account for a fair share of observed 
regional income difference within countries, accounting for such differences exacerbates unexplained 
differences in living conditions between countries.  
43.  So far our main focus has been on examining inequality of incomes within countries—in closing, 
we turn briefly to examining income disparities within the EU-as-a-whole. As noted earlier, much of 
the income inequality in the European Union is between rather than within countries: average 
incomes in Lithuania (the poorest member) and Luxembourg (the richest) differ by the same order of 
magnitude as the income differences between the poorest and richest deciles within these countries. 
Analysis of income inequality across 22 EU countries in Table 1 yields an overall Gini coefficient of 
0.40 for Europe-as-a-whole—considerably higher than the Gini for individual countries, and of 
similar magnitude to the Gini coefficient of 0.4118 in the United States (see also Box 2). 19 
                                                 
18 2007 UNDP Human Development Report. 
19 Inclusion of Germany, Bulgaria, and Romania would further exacerbate observed aggregate EU income inequality. 
  22Box 2: Is Income Inequality in Europe Much Lower Than in the United States? 
Conventional wisdom suggests that the United States, with its relatively small size of government and lower share of 
expenditures on public transfers than comparator European OECD countries, has much higher income inequality than 
Europe. Indeed most cross-country comparisons of income inequality show the United States to have higher inequality 
than any individual country in Europe. For instance, the 2007/08 UN Human Development Report shows the Gini 
Coefficient in United States to be 0.41, considerably higher than the corresponding estimate for Latvia (0.38)—the EU 
member state with the highest income inequality. Similarly, the LIS data also confirm that income inequality in European 
countries is in general quite low (Gini of around 0.25 – 0.32) and considerably lower than in the United States. When 
making such comparisons, however, it is important to bear in mind the much larger size of the United States compared 
to the typical EU member state—the population of the US is more than three times as large as Germany, the largest EU 
member. While inequality within European countries is lower than in the United States—indeed considerably lower in 
some cases—this isn’t necessarily true for Europe as-a-whole, since between-country inequality in Europe is higher than 
between-states inequality in the US (Chart).  



























0 10 20 30 40 50
States/Countri es from Poor est to Richest
 
Note: 2005 US$ GSP per capita of the 50 US states is represented by green dots; 2005 GDP per capita of the 25 EU members is 
represented by blue (in Euros) and red (PPS) dots. 
How is this possible, given that virtually all EU member states devote a considerably larger share of GDP to social 
transfers, which in turn are widely accepted to be quite well-targeted to the poor within these countries? A number of 
factors help explain this apparently paradoxical finding. First, most of social assistance in the United States is provided 
through federal welfare programs targeted at the country’s poorest regions. In Europe, by contrast, comparable transfers 
to the poorest regions would require substantially greater inter-governmental transfers within the European Union than 
is presently the case. Second, despite the relatively recent (and limited) opening-up of cross-border employment within 
the European Union, labor mobility is still considerably lower than in the US, and so plays a much smaller role in 
equalizing incomes across countries. Third, employment rates in the US are considerably higher than in the EU, and also 
play a major role in equalizing incomes across families. 
  237.  CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
44.  Among EU8 countries, the Baltic countries were the first to introduce a flat rate personal income 
tax system,20 starting with Estonia (1994), Lithuania (1994), and then Latvia (1997), while Slovakia 
also followed suit in 2004. While Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Poland continue to 
implement a multi-rate tax system, several political parties in these countries have announced that 
introduction of a flat-rate tax system is an important element of their political platform,
 and the pros 
and cons of the introducing such a system are the subject of considerable public debate.21 While the 
main motivating factor for introducing flat rate taxes has been a desire to simplify the tax system and 
lower tax rates to spur investment and growth, opposition against their introduction in many 
countries has tended to mainly be on equity grounds, as opponents argue that phasing-out the 
existing multi-rate tax rate structure would adversely impact the progressivity of the taxation system.  
45.   The findings of this paper show that direct taxes in all EU8 countries, including those that have 
a flat-rate tax system, are very progressive in nature. Moreover, a comparative analysis of the relative 
contributions of the tax and benefit system to the overall decrease in income inequality within the 
country shows the taxation system in flat-rate tax countries (i.e. Estonia, Lithuania, and Slovakia) in 
fact contributes a larger share of the overall decrease in income inequality attributable to the national 
tax and benefit system than in other EU8 countries (i.e. Slovenia, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic – see Chart 10).22 Further analytic work is needed to better-understand whether the 










Tax system Benefit system
 
Source: World Bank staff calculations based on data from the 2006 EU Survey of Income and Living Conditions 
                                                 
20 A flat rate tax is a tax system with a constant rate applied to household income, typically with income below a statutorily 
determined level (that in turn depends on household demographics) exempt from taxation. 
21 For instance, Prime Minister Donald Tusk in Poland was recently quoted as saying that the ruling Civic Platform hopes 
to introduce a flax-tax by 2011 (Reuters, 29th April 2008);  while Hungary’s Socialist Party has consistently opposed the idea 
of a flat tax, a number of opposition parties are in favor of its introduction; when simplifying the tax code in Slovenia in 
2006, the government eventually dropped the idea of introducing a flat tax rate in the face of strong political and public 
opposition. Finally, while the Czech Republic operates a progressive-rate tax system of individual taxation that differs from 
the flat-tax rate in neighboring Slovakia, the government has continued lowering the amount of tax paid by individuals 
through introducing a series of tax cuts since 1999. 
22 Among EU15 countries, the relative contribution of the national benefits systems are generally a bit lower than in the 
EU8 countries, and vary from a high of 46 percent in Belgium to only 27 percent in the United Kingdom. progressivity of the direct tax system in the former group is mainly due to differences in composition 
of incomes (i.e. shares attributable to labor income, rental income, dividends and other earnings, 
benefits and transfers, etc.) across various income groups or, alternately, if the observed progressivity 
is due to other design features (e.g. level of overall exemption threshold / exemption of certain types 
of incomes from taxation, etc.), as the answer to this question will have important bearing on the 
relative benefits and costs of introducing flat-rate taxation systems. 
46.  Another area where the findings of this paper may have important policy implications concerns 
regional policy in the European Union. As shown in this paper, prevailing levels of income inequality 
within EU countries are in general quite low by international standards. By contrast, inequality 
between EU countries is quite large. Thus, whether one thinks of inequality in Europe as being low 
compared to—for instance—the United States depends upon the perspective taken. At the level of 
each individual country, this is certainly true, but not so for the EU-overall: income disparities 
between Lithuania and Denmark are in fact much larger than between Mississippi and Connecticut.23 
47.  In the period 2007-2013, the EU has allocated 347 billion euros (over one-third of its budget) to 
transfers for regional policy with the objective of reducing economic and social disparities among 
member states. About four-fifths of the total earmarked resources are directed toward the 
“convergence objective”—i.e. to “promote growth-enhancing conditions and factors leading to real 
convergence for the least-developed member states and regions”.24 However, it is unlikely this 
objective can be met through fiscal means alone, at least not without increasing inter-country 
transfers far beyond what seems politically or administratively feasible at present. Instead, reducing 
economic disparities within the EU will require action on other fronts as well. The experience of the 
United States, with its highly mobile labor force and the important role this plays in helping to 
equalize incomes across different states, is again relevant. Clearly, greater labor mobility has an 
important role to play in reducing income inequalities within the European Union, though our 
analysis suggests that much of these welfare gains are likely to arise with greater labor mobility 
between rather than within countries.  
 
                                                 
23 The poorest and richest countries / states in the two regions (excluding Luxembourg, Delaware, and the District of 
Columbia due to their unique economic status; their inclusion would not, however, alter the main point being made here. 
24 See http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/object/index_en.htm. The other two main objectives of regional policy 
are to promote (i) Regional competitiveness and employment, and (ii) European territorial cooperation. 
  25ANNEX 1: DATA SOURCES 
EU-SILC data 
48.  The EU-SILC is an instrument aiming at collecting timely and comparable micro data on income 
poverty and social exclusion in countries of the European Union. This instrument is anchored in the 
European Statistical System, and aims to provide two types of data: (i) cross-sectional data pertaining 
to a given time or a certain time period with variables on income, poverty, social exclusion and other 
living conditions, and (ii) longitudinal data pertaining to individual-level changes over time, observed 
periodically typically over a four years period. The reference population of EU-SILC is all private 
households and their current members residing in the territory of the member states at the time of 
data collection. Persons living in collective households and in institutions are generally excluded from 
the target population, but in general the excluded population in each country is no more than 2 
percent of the total national population. All 25 EU member states25, along with Norway and Iceland, 
were covered in the 2005 and 2006 rounds. 
49.  Four main types of data are gathered in EU-SILC: (i) variables measured at the household level; 
(ii) information on household size and composition and basic characteristics of household members; 
(iii) income and other more complex variables termed ‘basic variables’ (education, basic labor 
information and second job) measured at the personal level, but aggregated to construct household-
level variables; and (iv) variables collected and analyzed at the person-level ‘the detailed variables’ 
(health, access to health care, detailed labor information, activity history and calendar of activities’). 
This paper utilizes data from the 2005 and 2006 EU-SILC cross-sectional rounds, but not from the 
longitudinal component (which is not yet available in the public domain). The main EU-SILC 
variables used in our analysis are equivalized disposable income as well as data on taxes and benefits 
(see Box 1). Further details pertaining to the specific variables included in the micro data sets, as well 
as the specific sample selection procedures followed in each country covered in the survey, can be 
found in the EU-SILC user database descriptions for the respective years.
1 
 
EBRD-World Bank Life in Transition Survey 
50.  This paper also uses data for the EU8 countries from the 2006 Life in Transition Survey (LiTS), 
carried out between August and October 2006.  This survey provides a snapshot of welfare of people 
in the ECA region. In each country, the questionnaire was administered to a nationally representative 
sample of 1,000 households using face-to-face interviews.26  
51.  The survey’s main objective was to assess the impact of transition on people, and the 
questionnaire covered four main themes. First, it collected personal information on aspects of 
material well-being, including household expenditures, possession of various consumer durable 
goods. Second, the survey included measures of satisfaction and attitudes towards economic and 
political reforms and public service delivery. Third, the LiTS captured individual “histories” through 
                                                 
25 Bulgaria and Romania were not then EU members. Data for Germany was not included in the databases we obtained 
from Eurostat. In addition, Cyprus, Norway, and Iceland have been excluded from the tables and figures in this paper.  
26 Please see EBRD, Life in Transition, a Survey of People’s Experience and Attitudes May 2007, for a more detailed description of 
the survey as well as a summary of some of its main findings. The countries covered in the survey are Albania, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia (not in ECA, but 
included because its an EBRD client country), Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, 
Turkey, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 
  26transition—i.e. from 1989 to the present, especially key events and episodes that may have influenced 
their attitudes towards reforms, and collected information on individuals; family background, on their 
employment situation, and on coping strategies during transition. Finally, the survey also attempted 
to capture the extent to which crime and corruption are affecting peoples’ lives, and the extent to 
which individuals’ trust in other people and in state institutions has changed over time.27  
52.  The LiTS data set also includes several key questions of special interest for this paper. 
Respondents were asked to what extent they agreed with the statement: “The gap between the rich 
and the poor in this country should be reduced”, with responses coded using a 5-point scale 
(1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree). In addition, respondents were also asked if they thought the 
state should be involved in reducing the gap between the rich and the poor (1=not involved, 
2=moderately involved, and 3=strongly involved), the factors they felt were most important to 
succeed in life (1=effort and hard work, 2=intelligence and skills, 3=political connections, 
4=criminal/corrupt ties, 5=other), and finally also about their opinions regarding the main reason 
why there are some people in need in the country (1=unlucky, 2=lazy/lack willpower, 3=injustice in 
society, 4=inevitable part of modern life, and 5=other). 
 
                                                 
27 For more details on the LiTS as well as the preliminary survey findings, see Life in Transition: A survey of people’s 
experience and attitudes, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, London, 2007. 
  27ANNEX 2: PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR REDISTRIBUTION 
53.  To better understand the observed variation in level of public support for government 
involvement in redistribution, we apply an ordered probit model to the LiTS data to analyze 
respondents’ expressed level of support for state involvement in reducing the income-gap between 
the rich and poor, according to the following model specification:  
i i i x y ε β + =
' *  
  28
j−1
54.  We do not observe 
*
i y  directly, but rather only observe whether  i y = 1, 2, and 3 if 
j i y α  (j= 1, 2, and 3 respectively)—i.e. the responses are “Not involved”, “Moderately 
involved” and “Strongly involved” respectively. A relatively parsimonious set of factors that we think 
influence the level of support for redistribution of the respondent is summarized in the table below.  
α < <
*
Variable Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Govt_role 8,001  2.55  0.61  1  3 
Lnpcexp 7,988  8.98  0.66  4.08  11.14 
Unjust 8,002  0.38  0.49  0  1 
Crim_corr 8,002  0.27  0.44  0  1 
Diff 8,002  -0.82  2.08  -9  9 
Urban 8,002  0.63  0.48  0  1 
Govt_role: Do you think the state should be involved in reducing the gap between the rich and the poor? coded as 1 = 
Not involved, 2 = Moderately involved, 3 = Strongly involved. 
Lnpcexp:  (Log) per equivalent adult (using OECD scales) annual expenditures (in PPP$) 
Unjust:  Dummy variable indicating response to “Why are some people in need today?” is “injustice in our society” vs. 
“because they are unlucky”, “laziness / lack of willpower”, “inevitable part of modern life”, or “other”. 
Crim_corr: Dummy variable indicating response to “Which of the factors in the list is the most important to succeed in life 
in this country now?” is either “Criminal/corrupt ties” or “Political connections” as opposed to “effort and 
hard work”, “intelligence and skills”, or “other”. 
Diff:  Change in self-perceived decile group ranking between 1989 and present 
Urban:  Dummy variable indicating respondent lives in urban areas 
55.  The results of the ordered probit regression are as summarized below 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
Ordered probit regression          Number of obs   =  7987 
        LR  chi2(12)          =  983.18 
        Prob  >  chi2          =  0.0000 
Log likelihood  = -6897.2434        Pseudo R2       =  0.0665 
Dependent variable: Govt_role 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
    Coef.    Std. Err.    z  P>z     [95% Conf.  Interval] 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
Lnpcexp  -.141359  .0226207  -6.25  0.000    -.1856947  -.0970233 
Unjust    .3861695  .0284654  13.57  0.000     .3303784  .4419607 
Crim_corr   .2399325  .0292308  8.21  0.000     .1826413  .2972238 
Diff    -.0616844  .0064181  -9.61  0.000    -.0742636  -.0491052 
Urban    -.1211775  .0282053  -4.30  0.000    -.1764589  -.065896 
Czech Republic       (omitted country) 
Poland        .0673337  .0398107  1.69  0.091    -.0106939  .1453612 
Slovakia      .3627363  .0597159  6.07  0.000     .2456953  .4797772 
Estonia       .5002743  .1050907  4.76  0.000     .2943003  .7062482 
Hungary      .5140795  .0515831  9.97  0.000     .4129785  .6151804 
Latvia        .6754206  .0882011  7.66  0.000     .5025497  .8482916 
Lithuania     .7862243  .0772582  10.18  0.000     .6348009  .9376476 
Slovenia     1.019498  .0980691  10.40  0.000     .8272863  1.21171 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 